If to speak about results of the military operation in Syria, they are generally favorable for Russia. Strategically the problem is solved to prevent military defeat Assad and treated adverse trends associated with the promotion of “green” and “blacks” in government-controlled areas of Syria.
Syria. The end of August 2015.
Syria. March 2016.
Let’s review the main directions, where in one form or another SAHA provided support for the Russian contingent (in addition to Iran and Hezballa).
1. Latakia and Idlib – in General, there is considerable successes achieved under control of the border, the rebels in Northern Latakia suffered a serious military defeat, the troops went into southern Idlib, overcome defensive line in the mountainous areas of Latakia and taken the Bastion of “green” in Northern Latakia. Because of the nature of the terrain, and stubborn resistance of the militants and aid from Turkey, to fully close the border and reach into the Central regions of Idlib province failed. Operational success is not transformed into a strategic.However removed the threat of Latakia and Tartus, which by September 2015 was under threat.
2. Aleppo– here achieved maximum success – released Kouvaris, cut the track going to a’zaz, defeated the troops of the Caliphate to the East of Aleppo, has dealt a telling blow green to the South of Aleppo, 2 times successfully repulsed the counterattack of the Caliphate on the track at Khanasser and the counter-offensive of the Caliphate to al-Safira. Unsolved problems (in addition to a complete cleaning of the city) – not established controls over the highway Damascus-Aleppo, taken al-Bab and Deir-Hafer.Overall, Russia has ensured the successful development of the battle for Aleppo, which was one of the key battles of the Syrian war (on the scale of forces involved it is of course not Stalingrad, but here is the duration and size of the territory on which there was a fight somewhere near there).
3. HOMS – decisive results were achieved. Rastanski the boiler has not been eliminated (attempts to cut it into two parts has failed), the route of HOMS-Hama was not released. However, the militants left the suburbs of HOMS, and he Rastanski the boiler is decreased in size. In General, there is significant operational result was not achieved, and successes were rather modest.
4. Hama – the biggest setback in six months. Supported VKS RF SAA offensive in Northern Hama choked due to the heavy losses in armoured vehicles (supplied by Turkey and Saudi Arabia complexes TOW here well shown), moreover, was lost Marek, and parts of North Carnaza. To form El Latinsky the boiler failed. The largest and essentially the only operational success the “green” over the past half-year.In the Eastern districts of the province of Hama prevented a significant advance troops of the Caliphate from the desert regions to key roads, the front here has been largely positional in nature. Overall, in the province of Hama successes were rather modest.
5. Mahin and Palmyra – 2 times Caliphate took Mahin and 2 times SAHA knocked him out. In General, here the parties were at their. The Caliphate could not hold Mahin and exit to the highway Damascus-HOMS. SAHA supported VKS RF are unable to take al-Karantina and Palmyra.In the case of Palmyra, in my opinion this is the most important omission from the point of view of prestige (both within Syria and beyond), the release of Palmyra with the participation of the Russian contingent would have given Russia a lot of political UPS and diplomaticheskogo nature, the more that proclivities toward Palmyra were made in the fall, but here the Caliphate rested horn in Palmyra SAHA was not allowed. However, given the fact that the contingent is not displayed at all, and the battles near Palmyra continues, then Russia will be able to assist the liberation of the ancient city.
6. Damascus – the battle for the Damascus suburbs in General have not led to the liberation of occupied by militants areas – was cleared of a lot of suburban areas, several residential blocks and 1 important air base, but dense residential and industrial buildings + constructed by the enemy of surface and underground fortifications were not given these tactical successes in Douma, ghouta, Jobar and Derie lead to the total elimination of “green” enclaves in the area of the Syrian capital. In General, there are quite reasonable successes.
7. Deraa in six months of fighting in the South, SAHA has been able to expand the control zone in the city, to release Atman and Sheikh Miskin, but the tasks overlap like the Syrian-Jordanian border were beyond the capabilities of the current SAA groups in southern parts of the country, and the focus of the Russian war effort was in the Northern and Central regions of Syria, so it would be strange to expect an unprecedented victories. The southern front in General were minor.
8. The attack on Raqqa – unfolded after the victory over the Caliphate to the East of Aleppo, the attack on Raqqa considerably slowed down after the counterattack of the Caliphate of Khanasser that required to transfer the troops to the track from the North and the South-East, which slowed the development of operations SAHA. Counter-attack has been stoped, at the moment the fighting continues, but in light of the decline in Russian military involvement, prospects of attack on the capital of the Caliphate rather vague.Much here will depend on what forces Russia will leave Syria, how will Iran and Hezballa (whose units typically operate in key areas), as will the planned ground operation against the Pentagon, Mosul and Raqqa and will there be a “race for Raqqa” in principle (as there is not zero probability that Russia will give the Americans the opportunity to play the “small victorious war” with attempts to take Mosul and Raqqa).
9. Deir ez-Zor – full deblokade of the city speech certainly did not go in because of the distance of enclave from the main Syrian forces. Russia helped to establish the supply of the garrison of enclave and at the critical moment, there involved distant aircraft, which allowed the Syrians to fight off the powerful attack of the Caliphate, which nearly led to irreparable consequences. It is more likely that the enclave will help to release the Kurds leading a successful offensive from the North.After the capture of the Kurdish al-Shadadi, will probably attempt to advance to the Euphrates, and zablokirovan Deir-ez-Zor, to cut under the American plans of communications of the Caliphate between Syria and Iraq.
10. The Syrian-Turkish border – in addition to Idlib and Latakia, Russia has been conducting operations in the border areas with Turkey. They cost 1 su-24 and 1 Mi-8 (in the Turkish provocations), but helped to create the conditions for successful offensive by the Kurds, who cut the portion of the route South of Azaz and actually put a block in the way of oil supplies via a’zaz which was in the territory of green within the gray schemes on the trade of oil products between Turkey and the Caliphate.Overall, the impact here was very limited, but some results were achieved, the more Russia is rather acting by proxy in the framework of situational shared interests with the Syrian Kurds.
One of the results of operations of VC and RF were the issues of oil trade between the Caliphate and Turkey.
If to sum up, then:
1. The task of military stabilisation of the Syrian government successfully solved. Question military defeat of Assad with the agenda cleared. This is the main strategic achievement. Despite the fact that military assistance was rendered to Assad at a very late stage (it would be a year in 2012-2013), six months of intensive military aid has led to the understanding of the West the simple fact that to militarily overthrow Assad will not work. In autumn we observed the wreck of the former U.S. strategy in the middle East.In fact, she’s already on the incense breathed, Russia simply chose a favourable moment for their actions, which allowed Russia to demonstrate that the middle East Obama’s strategy completely failed, which caused the most hysteria in the American military-political establishment and forced the White House, the state Department and the Pentagon during the winter feverishly to change plans in Syria and Iraq, the result of which was the decision to begin land operation in Iraq.
2. In addition, Russian troops helped liberate quite a large number of areas and settlements, to clear the Turkish-Syrian border, cutting off some of the channels of the oil trade between the Caliphate and Turkey. The position of Assad in view of this, obviously improved. Position “green” and “black” seemed to have worsened, although on the defeat of those and others to say of course not necessary, given the help of their foreign sponsors.The enemy suffered significant losses in men and materiel (the trophy were knocked out of the air defense systems, artillery installations, tanks, MLRS – spring 2016 lack of heavy weapons began to annoy the militias who were trying to fight like a regular army). Rare trophies are not allowed to compensate for the loss (unlike SAA who received serious logistical assistance), impact and the lack of anti-tank weapons (hence the request to Saudi Arabia and Turkey to increase the supply of anti-tank guided missiles and ATGM).
3. The main victims of Russia’s actions in Syria is of course “green”. It is obvious that the pretext of “fighting ISIS” covered the main motive of the military operation – the elimination of the threat from “green” that threatened key settlements relied upon by the legitimate Syrian government. The Syrian Free Army and al-Nusra, Ahrar al-sham, Jah al-Islam and other “green” groups had up to 70-80% of departures, not to mention the actions of land troops, the Caliphate too. but strictly in key areas, when RF ATT stopped the offensive attempt of the Caliphate.The bombing of the logistical infrastructure of the Caliphate allowed to affect the economic position of “blacks”, which, coupled with the American bombing led to the deterioration of the economic and financial situation of the regime in raqqa. The West’s inability to define a list of “good” and “bad” terrorists has allowed Russia enough to arbitrarily determine who to bomb, to indicate the desired goals as belonging to the Caliphate or to unnamed terrorists. This gave Russia considerable freedom of action and on the other hand forced the sponsors of “green” to negotiate with Assad in the framework of the Vienna process.
4. However, the threat from the Caliphate is still not clear yet, development of operations condensed CAA with the support of the East of Aleppo. Having entered the war with the Caliphate Russia to escape it won’t attack over the Sinai, infiltration of the terrorist infrastructure of a Caliphate on the territory of the Russian Federation and the former republics of the USSR, the activities of Vilayat of the Caucasus, the spread of jihadist propaganda – all this is still here and not going anywhere. Ignoring the core of this threat, the fight against the above will be a struggle with symptoms, whereas “cure” need a source of disease.That problem can be solved by Americans or Assad, I have my doubts. In the United States are rather mundane tasks – to reach a pair of significant victories and declare “victory over the Caliphate”, while it will continue to spread to different regions of the world and continue to operate in Syria and Iraq, Assad’s frankly not enough forces to clear Syria.The question here is not about what Russia should bear the burden of ground operations against Raqqa but I would like to see a more comprehensive strategy aimed at the destruction of the Caliphate, in which Russia could act. So far there is no clarity, although it is obvious that “black” is better to destroy it than on the territory of Russia and neighboring countries. In my opinion from a military point of view of military strategy of the Russian Federation in respect of the Caliphate at the moment, looks quite misty and here I would like clarity.
5. Question of the losses of the parties is quite vague as all veterans act according to the principle of “Write more, which they considered to basurman”. The question of losses of the Russian Federation in force of the classified act, since know how much cost this operation, but I don’t think it’s too expensive (for the six months of the war, the fighters did not bother to knock at least one aircraft, the Turks had to connect). CAA losses were quite significant both in the people and technology (without Russian supplies SAHA it would be hard for a few months to conduct offensive actions).The same can be said about “green” with the Caliphate. All parties happily showed a pile of corpses of their opponents, but some of the composite objective calculation is not met. From what I have seen over the past half-year, there was a feeling that in the fighting from September to March in Syria and Iraq have killed tens of thousands of people + a large enough number of civilians.
6. Russia could use Syria among other things as a way to try out various new examples of aviation and ground equipment, to further improve reconnaissance assets, UAVs and interaction mechanisms of different types of troops in combat. Of course it was not free – from the point of view of Finance it is obvious not cheap (the figures are of course classified). The content of contigent, maintenance equipment, consumable bombs, shells and rockets, military supplies CAA.All this in addition to the war in Ukraine, seriously loaded Russian defense budget (especially in light of the announced reduction of 5%). If the amount is unaffordable? Navryadli. Significant? It may very well be. As with the issue of loss, then clarity will come only after some time after the war, and maybe later.
7. What does the withdrawal itself? Of course Russia is not completely out. Remain base in Tartus and Mamimi, the last one is a nice bonus for participating, since until October 2015, Russia had not had such a promising base in the middle East. Remain air defense systems, ships in the Mediterranean sea, reconnaissance aircraft, UAV, protection of military facilities in the amount of 800-1200 people, the staff of special services. Probably will be various military advisors, PMCs and instructors.The big question will be displayed to a contingent – what amount of output in addition to aviation groups, to decrease ground presence, because of the Russian complexes of barreled and jet artillery played a significant role in the offensive action the CAA, and the supplied T-72 and T-90 have played an important role in the victories of SAA under Aleppo.Will the equipment be serviced entirely by the Syrians, will further deliveries of equipment and ammunition whether or not to continue the work of the instructors, how long the military advisers – these are many questions, answers yet, because of secrecy around the actions of land of the land forces of the Russian Federation in Syria. I believe that the development of operations during the 2nd half of March will bring the answer to most of them. It should be remembered that declaratory statements about the parameters of the RF group in Syria may differ from actual.
As to political reasons had prompted the management of the Russian Federation on the withdrawal of troops, at the moment it is not clear why this happened. Second, several explanations, within the framework of the above described discourse “Cunning Plan vs. Putin merged”. Its position about what is waiting for Syria, I set out back in October and today’s talk about the federalization (with preservation of territorial integrity), a Bosnian variant, other forms of post-war reconstruction in Syria for me was not news.What this will lead is not yet clear – there is no complete picture on the real agreements the U.S. and Russia on Syria, there is no clarity to the question of direct negotiations between Assad and green, there is no clarity with the Kurdish factor and the prospects of the Kurdish-Turkish war, which threatens to turn into a Turkish intervention in Syria.To say that Russia comes out completely making the effort in my opinion prematurely (they should not be like Bush, which on the broadcast carrier, as the U.S. won the war in Iraq), the end result of the strategic operations of Russia in Syria will be visible, when it will be clear what the outcome of the current diplomatic stage. If a compromise is reached and Syria will go the way of the post-war settlement, the Russian Federation will gather to himself all the laurels of a peacemaker, although here much will depend on what place will be taken by Assad and the alawites in a post-war Syria.If the talks are disrupted and the active action of SAHA against the main mass of the “green” vozobnovitsya, then the withdrawal will obviously look premature. However, partial reduction of the group leaves for the Russian Federation it possible to play back under certain scenarios.
If to speak about my personal attitude, as you know I initially supported the operation and believed that it could lead to a “new Afghanistan”.
In my opinion, in addition to the need to stabilize the Assad regime and against the jihadists, the unspoken purpose of the operation was to break diplomatic isolation and direct contacts with the USA, because of the continuing stalemate in Ukraine. Syria has become a way to circumvent one of the problems of Obama’s ultimatum, forcing US once again to discuss something with Russia, although operations in Syria, Washington’s position was generally associated with the fact that to talk to Russia in General, then about.
As a result, the problem in Ukraine has eroded, although a fully charged was not, as Russia still demand to give the Donbass and the Crimea, and sanctions no one out is not going to.
Will Russia’s actions in Syria have long-term implications for Russian-American relations? It all depends on how negotiations go Assad and “green”, how successful will the operation of the Pentagon in Iraq, what will the conflict in Ukraine and who will be the President of the United States. Chances are that in the beginning of next year in the U.S. could be revision policy of the Russian Federation (not in terms of the rejection of anti-Russian policy, but in terms of changing attitudes towards limiting and weakening of the Russian Federation).So on the one hand Russia’s actions in Syria may be non-obvious positive for the Russian Federation implications of the need for the U.S. to reconsider its course and to be just a temporary respite on the way to the next escalation when a new administration decides to take tougher on Russia. Because at the moment we still do not know much about all the reasons of the decision on the withdrawal of troops and the outcome of certain key military and political processes, to speak of “Peremoga” and “sradh” in my opinion prematurely.
In my opinion the conflict the US and Russia this year, as in the next over.
The fighting in Ukraine and Syria will in some form continue, the sanctions regime will operate. The reasons for this are that the systemic contradictions of the U.S. and Russia has not been eliminated, and they are the driving force behind the current conflict.
The Fourth Revolutionary War 