The results of the active work on the creation of “the 5th Legion”, already seen during the attack on Palmyra.The guys that train at our photos, you’ll get the opportunity to prove themselves during the spring campaign of 2017.
In the Internet appeared photos armed with AKM man of Slavic appearance in fatigues with no visible insignia, but in a stripe of the Russian flag. Location attributed as Syria (the Palmyra). Attention was drawn to the armored vehicle Iveco 65E19WM (LMV).
In terms of long-term strategy, the loss of Palmyra of course greatly complicates the preparations for the unblocking of Deir ez-Zor. This is actually the main operational problem with the loss of Palmyra. But as we have shown failure at Palmyra and Tabqa stretched far ahead of “gut” with open flanks, quite vulnerable to attacks on communications and for planning the return of Palmyra, or a more ambitious hike to Deir-ez-Zor have to solve a non-trivial task of protecting the flanks of the advancing group. But it is rather a long-term problem.It appears that without preliminary Stripping of the oil fields North of Palmyra in the direction Itree, to launch an offensive in Deir ez-Zor is unlikely to succeed. While the SAA deals with more mundane things associated with the stabilization of the front in Eastern HOMS.
Over the past 48-hours, six hundred Russian special forces have landed at the Hmaymeem Airbase on the Syrian coast and been transferred to Al Safira, a city in the Aleppo governorate strategically located on the Damascus-Aleppo Highway. From there they will be placed along the Castello Road, formerly the main lifeline for the Syrian Opposition from Turkey, helping channel arms, money, and food to Turkish-backed militants in eastern Aleppo.
The level of air power Russia deploys and uses in Syria depends on the success of its military advisors in conducting the intense train-and-equip program for the SAA. Some of these advisors are personnel belonging to Russia’s most secretive military organization: the Special Operations Forces Command (Komandovaniye Sil Spetsial’nykh Operatsiy—KSSO). These forces are acclaimed for their roles in seizing Crimea and, more recently, for their involvement in operations in Syria. They constitute an important force multiplier in the Kremlin’s efforts to apply small numbers of military personnel and assets to achieve maximum impact toward political-military objectives
As the Russian drawdown from Syria continues, more information continues to emerge about the forces Moscow had committed to shoring up the Assad regime. One telling aspect is how involved Russia’s Spetsnaz special forces were in the deployment. They were involved in two of their three core missions — reconnaissance and special security missions — but not the third, direct combat operations. The implication is that from the outset of the deployment, Moscow planned to minimize its exposure in this messy and bloody war.