The deployment of reinforcements in Hama from July 9.. in Addition to “the 5th Legion” and the Russian military operated in the operations South of the airbase of the Giro and participated in the elimination of the boiler.
The concentration of reserves for an attack on the position of the Caliphate in Eastern Hama and Eastern Homs is the logical consequence of not too successful attempts to directly break the defense of militants in the direction of Akerbat. Unlike high-profile successes in the South of Syria, here the pace of progress is low, the enemy has organized and effective resistance, good use of terrain and tactics of mobile groups to organize a chilling action. The forces that were concentrated in the Eastern Hama in may 2017, was obviously insufficient for the solution of operational tasks that demanded as the transfer of additional forces withdrawn from the Western areas of Raqqa province, and the Russian air support, which should facilitate the solution of command problems. History repeats itself with the onset of the militants of Idlib in March 2017, which led to months of fighting in Northern Hama, with which the group of the SAA is concentrated to the North of Hama dealt frankly so-so, then, too, demanded the transfer of serious reserves for relief arose after the breakthrough of the front operational crisis.
Russian military advisers and means of ensuring that obvious should encourage new attempts at breaking the defense of the Caliphate, just as in April they helped to halt the advance of militants, and then to drive them back to El Latino and Moreco.
The Syrians and their allies essentially have two choices – either a straight line to push the insurgents to Acerbate, gradually squeezing out the existing ledge, forcing the militants to leave the territory to the East of HOMS and Hama. Or to strike at the base of the projection, creating the danger of a large boiler in order to force the main forces of the militants to retreat to Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor. In theory, these threats can be combined, but most likely given the length of the front line (in some places quite abstract), to both immediately, not strong enough. Appears to blow from the North to the rear of groups of the Caliphate looks more promising, especially as the SAA already has successful experience of such operations. Hacking organized defense of the Caliphate directly, too, can be successful, but it will likely take more time and will clearly be associated with a significant loss, especially since the enemy does not stay in defensive for the last few days, the SAA has lost more than 50 killed and wounded, and several armored vehicles.Caps there obviously cast aside it does not, requires good operational work and serious efforts of the troops that we most likely will see in the course of the development of the July transactions, which judging by the growing attraction of reserves is a priority for the Syrian command and its military partners.
The reasons of such attention to this area is quite trivial. By Liquidating this ledge, Damascus dramatically increase the connectivity of their territories, eliminating the flanking threat to the highway Palmyra-Ties and threats of attacks on the rear communications. Strategic strikes the Caliphate, there most likely is not capable, but to create unpleasant pressure on the key transport arteries and nibbled SAA on secondary sites, it can benefit to focus mobile group of several hundred militants with carts, “black” is still quite capable.However due to serious losses at the “elite units” and a serious lack of armored vehicles, even the limited results of the Caliphate would be very difficult to hold, especially in the clash of large mechanized connection with a serious air cover.
Judging by the fact that “Tigers” in Hama not go and Shine in the area of Resafa, they have obviously another problem, which is likely linked to the release of significant areas in Raqqa province, with a view to moving towards Deir-ez-Zor. It is quite obvious that in the forefront of liberating Deir-ez-Zor have to go “Tigers” supported by Russian experts and videoconferencing. The situation on the frontline for the development of such operations at the moment are quite good.The Kurds are now more concerned about the occupation of villages on the southern Bank of the Euphrates, and the initial enthusiasm after the storm of Raqqa is already gone – it became clear that there will be in Mosul, Manbij and al-Baba, which means to rush at any price to break through the living quarters to the center of the city is meaningless – Raqqa will be to chew gradually, especially because the task of preventing Assad and Erdogan to storm Raqqa previously successfully solved. However, taking into account the losses of the Kurds in the battles for Raqqa (which was expected), this is a controversial achievement.But chasing the carrot of autonomism, Kurds no need to choose – charge of blood for the American support it was expected, that’s it and they pay in full.
For the Kurds, the Syrian operations against the Caliphate in Hama and HOMS objectively best fighters are forced to throw part of the reserves that will reduce the risks of counter-strike “black” on the positions of the SDF on the South Bank of the Euphrates. Plus, the expected occurrence of the SAA in the direction of Deir ez-Zor, in fact, will pass through the areas of potential concentration of fighters to counterattack in the direction of Raqqa. The Kurds and the Americans will try to take advantage of it, taking the most important settlements on the southern Bank of the Euphrates, leaving SAA sparsely populated region to the East and South-East of Resafa.
In the South expected the gradual displacement of green from the Eastern districts of the capital province. The battles here are rather sporadic due to the fact that the forces of the parties simply does not match the length of the local theater. Militants there are in fact only light infantry on carts, at that time, as the Syrians can always pull up additional forces here concentrated in the Damascus area, including armored vehicles, as well as provide air support.
In Deraa and Quneitra truce more or less completed, and so “transaction No. 3” still works. Its future depends on:
1. How much Iran will approach the task of construction of a “Shiite of the bridge.”
2. The General context of us-Russian relations.
3. Competition between the SAA and SDF in the provinces of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, where the possibility of military incidents, including with participation of Russian and us military support operations of the parties.
For Damascus, objectively beneficial to the transaction have existed for at least several months to freeing a significant part of Syria, with a strong position to approach the new round of negotiations on the post-war settlement.
PS. Well as add-ons. The defense Ministry reported that during a mortar attack in Hama had killed a Russian military Advisor captain Nicholas Afonasov.