The situation in Eastern neighborhoods of Mosul to 29 November.
The painful progress towards Mosul from the South.
After completing “the race” of Mosul, the rate of advance has fallen and the military had to act on the mind, and not whack my forehead in residential districts, there to wash the blood and delight the Caliphate with various trophies.
The operation to take Mosul with the third week of November is completely broken into three parts:
1. A direct assault on Mosul from the East, which must be supported by a blow from the South, when the southern outskirts of the city finally deigns to come 2 meh.the teams mired in the battle on the banks of the Tiger South of Mosul.
2. The advance of Kurdish Peshmerga from the North and North-East of Mosul. Peshmerga to get into urban combat in no hurry, and simply provides a tightening ring of encirclement and increment the territory of Iraqi Kurdistan.
3. The operation of closing the ring around Mosul, which last week was a success, after a month after the start of the movement, advanced, mechanized group went to the tal Afar.
Of course, the current situation at the front, says that in January the Pentagon plan to liberate Mosul completely disrupted – the simultaneous exit of the coalition forces to the city from all directions did not, to begin a simultaneous assault from different directions failed, uprisings in Mosul against the Caliphate so do not wait. With grief in half, were only able to surround Mosul. Thus, the October estimates associated with the imminent capture of Mosul in November or even in the US presidential elections did not materialize. On more pessimistic estimates of the November full sweep of Mosul boiler can take from 2 to 5 months.
The reasons for the discrepancy between the plans of the United States with reality.
1. Underestimation of the resistance level of the Caliphate. “Black” has traditionally been competently manifest themselves in the defense, skillfully using the tactics of ambushes and sudden counterattacks where necessary – don’t waste troops hurl, and trying to conduct cost-effective mobile warfare. But in the last year a number of us generals have indicated that the underestimation of the military components of the war machine of the Caliphate is one of the reasons for the failures in Iraq.Some progress in this respect in the United States of course has been in planning for 2016-th year, the military regarded the Caliphate not as a conventional terrorist group, but as a quasi-state with its armed forces, which require a level approach of struggle with the armies of the industrial type.
2. The heterogeneity of the coalition and its contradictions. The difference between the interests of the United States, Iran, the Kurds and the Iraqi government led to the fact that the operation develops unevenly. Peshmerga solves the problem and is in no hurry to get into urban fighting in the North while the Iraqi army is bleeding in the Eastern neighborhoods. The US provides the Iraqis with artillery and air support, but throwing units of paratroopers and special forces into the meat grinder of street fighting are also not in a hurry.Shiite militia in addition to providing the front, do not miss the opportunity for settling accounts with the Sunnis in the liberated territories, which of course affects the resistance of “black”, as well as obtaining their support among the population.
3. The failure to cause the collapse of the defense of Mosul. To prepare and conduct the uprising of the local population in Mosul has not yet succeeded. Attempts to negotiate with the Caliphate, he went from Mosul to Syria, was leaked due to known leaks and potential “fifth column”, alifatici corny cut, that others do not povadno to hand over Mosul to the Americans.
4. Protracted the environment. Due to the fact that resistance on the Western Bank of the Tigris was stronger than expected, to ensure the encirclement of Mosul on the approaches failed. The shock group had almost a month to move through the desert to the tal Afar, there to close the encirclement with Peshmergas. But still have to clean up the area between tal-Afar and Mosul, which could take weeks, if not more.
As a result, the operation to take Mosul swiftly, when it quickly ripped open the defense of the Caliphate and connected in the center of Mosul, turned into something unintelligible, which only develops at the expense of the overwhelming superiority in men and materiel, with heavy losses and without any operational victories. For more than a month of fighting, the Caliphate lost about 2100-2300 killed and wounded, the loss of the coalition reach 4500-4700 killed and wounded (among whom, there are several dozen NATO soldiers). According to the them, the Caliphate lost up to 12 tanks, 25 armored combat vehicles and about 60 trucks. Also lost ammunition depots in the district of tal afar in the cities on the banks of the Tiger South of Mosul. However, given the rich reserves in the Mosul and systematic flow of trophies, special problems with BC from the militants is not yet in sight. The loss of the coalition are in the order of 35-40 destroyed and damaged tanks, more than 350 different BBP (BMP, BTR, MRAP, Humvee). As usual, the lion’s share of the losses in the attack, Shahid-mobiles, but the effectiveness of mobile anti-tank groups turned out to be a very unpleasant surprise.Serious losses and civil, as a result of bombing and fighting going on in residential areas, and ongoing mass executions from the “black”.
The military leadership of the Caliphate in Iraq (and, presumably, the Great Caliphate of Baghdad), located in Mosul and controls the defense of the city and surrounding areas. At the same time as the further tightening-up of the boiler around Mosul, the influence of the Iraqi capital of a Caliphate in the overall management of the “black areas” will fall and raqqa will gain increasing importance, since it is still possible to control both the Syrian and Iraqi territories in the West of Iraq.So despite the suffering of Americans and Iraqis from Mosul, in the medium term, this will deal a severe blow to the state structure of the Caliphate and will be another step on the road to military defeat of ISIS as a state. The problem during the assault on Mosul appears to stem from overly optimistic planning operations and “political factor” that made the military hostage to the political situation in the United States.
Here and below, the infantry of the Caliphate in Mosul area.
The propaganda of the Caliphate spreading shots “Mosul idyll”, they say while the city was being stormed, in schools children are taught.
The city is hauling the bodies of the dead irackich soldiers.
A suicide bomber who blew Kurds North of Mosul.
Americans from the 101st airborne division.
The military police of the United States in the Mosul area.
Paratroopers from the 101st airborne division guarding the reporter.
The high guest with the inspection.
The slain militants of the Caliphate.
In Basic, after the occupation of the city by Peshmergas.
Excavation of the burials of victims killed under the Caliphate of Mosul in 2014.
The consequences of air strikes in Mosul.
In the liberated town near Mosul.