Division | Colonel Cassad



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The General scheme of differentiating the “moderate Syrian opposition” by mid-January 2017, which has led to stretching in the autumn of conflict in Idlib between the FSA and “Ahrar al-sham” with “Jund al-Aqsa”.

Of the Russian Federation from the end of 2015 without much success tried to achieve from US, so they divided the militants into “moderate” and “immoderate” to make it clear who can negotiate and who will be whacked in the outhouse.

For 2016 year, managed to agree only on “Al-Nusra”, which the US and Turkey recognized the “excessive” and against which at least verbally pledged to keep fighting. “Jund al-Aqsa” was in this narrow list because of the inadequacy of their leaders as focusing on “Al-Nusra”, these leaders wanted to dominate in Idlib, as well as the rest of the group did not agree to it, “Jund al-Aqsa” organized a series of attacks on field commanders of the other groups to prove its leadership and force others to acknowledge its supremacy.This scheme is not new – the same act “alifatici” in 2013-2014, killing the militant commander, who refused to recognize the authority of Baghdadi. There is a simple principle, “If you not with us – or die.”

In this case, was not a creative copy of the ISIS methodology, which led to the disruption of the militants ‘ offensive in Northern Hama in the fall of 2016 and the big losses of the various militias during the bloody strife, which killed local warlords, and those who traveled to Idlib in the “green buses”. In particular, in the course of these fights was killed by “hero defense Darayya” who was drowned in the river. Thus, the “Jund al-Aqsa” in the number of “moderates” didn’t make it because of his own uporotyh.  Colleagues now consider them as “rabid dogs”, with whom it is better not to have.

On the “green coalition”, a significant portion of the organizations represented in Astana, where he continued the talks on the Syrian settlement. An important difference from previous meetings is the real militants and their representatives is a real military force (about 25-35 thousand) and not the usual gang of Syrian refugees in the additional forage from Washington or Riyadh.The structure of the FSA is extremely amorphous and generally dependent on external players and agreeing with them, the FSA will have to deal, regardless of who of the components of SAA will be for or against the agreement with Assad. Another issue with jihadist groups such as “Jaish al-Islam, Ahrar al-sham” or “File-al-sham”. They all seek at least partial political subjectivity and do not want to abandon the goals associated with the creation of the territory of the Syrian state is built on the principles of Sharia.Their dispute with the “Al-Nusra” or “Jund al-Aqsa” is largely not ideological, but methodological. Their ultimate goals are in tune. Therefore, there are difficulties to put all this “green” in the same category at the negotiating table because some people are actually always willing to do the will of foreign masters, and others are considering similar hosts and sponsors as a means to an end, where the preservation of a secular, multi-cultural Syria among the priorities not listed.

In fact, a complete separation of “moderate” and “immoderate” hasn’t happened yet – from the legal field has fallen so far, only the most notorious rogues, but if you take the scheme, then at least the same “Ahrar al-sham” is in the campaign with “An-Nusra and Jund al-Aqsa”.

Stauffenberg was Right!

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