This video allows you to do a little analysis of the actions of the militants during the storming of the village in the province of Latakia and to make some suggestions.
This is only my vision of this problem.
The overall picture
1. Mountainous area in Latakia, the configuration of settlements, scattered over the hills, the availability of unlimited opportunities to move off-road for fighters with light weapons, requires defending, in particular SAA, the diversion of considerable forces and funds to keep this settlement. The same applies to all other similar settlements in the conditions of passive defense and active defense approaches will be quite different, and we’ll talk about them below.
2. In the area of the settlement was occupied and artillery positions. Towed artillery takes time to make maneuver, but also weak preparation of the calculations of the suddenness of the actions of the militants, instability and disorganization of soldiers in defence, a lack of power to complete the organization of defense, tactical illiteracy of units, the result is almost the same. Fighters, using the suddenness and swiftness, in most cases, capturing major trophies, in this case you can see the capture of one D-30.
3. What can you say about the tactics of the militants and their motivations. First, about motivation. It is important for the stability of defense. If you do not take into account some staged this video, which is completely absent opposition from the defending troops, the motivation is present. The militants organized advances in the area of the operation, practically without opposition, the move crowded, but a relatively large group. Estimated, it can be argued that the assault was attended by 150-200 people, including drivers of carts.And it is in such circumstances considerable force, requiring the defender almost the same number, and for passive retention of the settlement, and twice more. That’s the first problem for the CAA, the need to divert significant forces on the organization of passive defense, and therefore, the lack of power for active offensive actions.
4. The advantage of fighters is that they have the initiative, choose the object of attack, concentrate forces and means in the desired direction, and almost unnoticed move in to attack with numerical superiority in manpower.
5. The second advantage of fighters, no need to keep garrisons in all the settlements under their control. If dislodged from the settlement of soldiers of the CAA, then they have it completely under control, and enough to leave observers that are current on the radio will report the change in the situation.
6. The third advantage is that the mobility, lack of heavy weapons with the exception of carts and heavy machine guns mounted on them, mass attack, discipline and relatively tactically in offensive operations.
You can even describe a lot of features, including those associated with knowledge of the situation on the object of attack, and the number defending, and the impossibility of strengthening the defenders in a reasonable time and sufficiency of forces and means, and the complacency of allowing the release of militants directly to the locality, and many other features.
But for us most importantly, how to prevent such a development.
And most importantly, how to finally turn the tide of the fighting, and as a priority, clear the entire province of Latakia from different colors of militants.
Just by improving the quality of advisers, due to the rearmament of soldiers of the Syrian army, through the creation in each settlement of the militia and its weapons, I think this will not solve the problem. Added to this is the need the direct responsibility of the attack on the territory occupied by the militants and destroy them.
To solve this problem, there are three ways of doing it. Maybe someone will offer other ways, but I see only three.
The first way is to leave everything as is. Let SAA itself clears its territory from the fighters, and we help to supply weapons and ammunition allocated advisors. Until this happens, and shows that these efforts are not enough. The Syrian army is necessary to focus directly on the front edge, but she has yet to allocate considerable forces to guard the rear and to guard the communications, and to keep the area where “green” and anti – “black”. This method needs to be changed.
The second method is to introduce a limited contingent of the Russian army not only for the protection and defense of bases in Latakia and Tartus, but also to provide close protection to a minimum of all the settlements who signed the armistice agreement, and there are about 170, and to guard the rear and communications. I like this method as not much like it for several reasons. The army should fight, and if you send troops, then on the cutting edge for conducting actual combat operations, especially since the troops have to do this, and heavy equipment and everything you need.On the one hand it is positive because troops and commanders get real combat practice. Will be tested in real combat conditions with new weapons, means of control and communication, reconnaissance and fire damage. But this group will require a significant amount of forces and means, including financial. Preliminary calculations show that the minimum in Lattakia and its surrounding provinces, without regard to Aleppo and Palmyra group should include at least 2 airborne division, 2 odshbr and 2 br Spetsnaz.We only have one or two (can’t tell) intelligence brigade, and here they would be very useful in addition to special forces teams. Here and typed about 30 thousand soldiers with heavy equipment. On the other hand, draw less power and money from the troops for the solution of minor problems (the rear guard, settlements, communication) is considered overhead and is impractical.
The third method is the involvement of Russian PMCs. It is clear that Russia has so far only discussed the question of whether or not to have PMCs. There is no law regulating the activities of PMCs lack of understanding how to control who the customer is, where to get funding. The results of the previous round table, which was mentioned in a previous post, foreign consumers, based on the negativity that comes from American PMCs, and lack of a clear position of Russia on this question, a little fear of the consequences of the participation of PMCs in solving arising problems.In every speech sound that there is no experience of using this service.
And in Russia there is no understanding of how it’s all put into practice, despite the fact that some of the information on the Internet about some private military company, which is funded by some Russian oligarch and performs some tasks on the territory of Syria, is present. Partly there are positive and quite a lot of negativity.
PMC is only in the title says it’s a private company, albeit owned by some private citizens, particularly if we are talking about Russian PMC, the citizens of Russia.
The PMC performs its tasks in accordance with intergovernmental agreements, direct contract and in accordance with international laws, the laws of their country and of the host country and controlled by the relevant services of the two countries. In the case of Russia, the PMC must be controlled directly by the Ministry of defence of the Russian Federation in interaction with other power structures. And in the international arena to perform tasks in accordance with the decision of the President of the Russian Federation on the direct orders of the Ministry of foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of defence of the Russian Federation.
Thus, briefly stated above, the Russian PMCs in the case of Syria, in accordance with the Law on PMCs, the “accepted” state Duma and signed by the President of the Russian Federation and in accordance with the intergovernmental agreement signed between the governments of Russia and Syria with funding allocated by customer (SAR), or in advance from the budget funds of the Russian Federation, perform the tasks in accordance with international treaties.
The main tasks for the Russian PMC can be: provision of consulting services for the organization of a comprehensive exploration of the SAA; organization and implementation of protection of settlements, concluded the ceasefire agreement and to prevent actions on their territory of terrorist gangs; protecting and providing cover transport communications from terrorist attacks; assisting in the delivery of humanitarian aid to civilians; trained security forces and military units the use of modern weapons and development of tactics of actions when solving different tasks;organization of consulting services for communication and management, business management and planning, and many other tasks that do not contradict international and domestic laws.
Group of PMCs to perform these tasks only in the province of Latakia may count up to 20 thousand employees of the Russian PMC. In the previous article on the events in raqqa there was a discussion with the reader that it is impossible to get such a number of employees of PMCs in Russia. My analysis shows that you can score much more. Much will depend on the approach to this problem, primarily from the state, and then from the professionalism of the management of PMCs.
The professionalism of the management of PMC depends not on mere obedience to superior commands, but mostly from creativity in addressing this question, in the appropriate comprehensive training for managers in understanding their specific application and existence of PMCs in the effective training of employees for specific tasks in thorough testing of application plans, the organization of interaction, comprehensive intelligence, in a sufficient amount of weapons and surveillance tools needed to ensure security functions,in the selection of personnel and individual training on the basis of the PMC.
What needs to be done to prevent offensive operations of the militants, which is shown in this video. We move to the main.
1. Hour exploration of the entire depth of the territory and of all types (this can provide only the PMC or the Russian army)
2. Organization of the defense of the village with the development of all existing and proposed variants of actions of the militants. This is a complex and time consuming issue that requires discipline and understanding of military science. There must be ways, from placing ambushes on remote approaches to the village, to mining roads and terrain in a controlled and cover of these sites ambushes.
3. Appropriate weapons. Most advisable to be armed with heavy weapons that carts with machine guns or ZSU, anti-tank systems, as portable, and lightly armored vehicles, 82 mm mortars for destroying fighters on the reverse slopes of the heights into the hollows, AGS. Mandatory must be a separation of sharpshooters armed with sniper rifles and one or two of the prepared calculation snipers.With means of providing: drones, stations, signals intelligence and electronic intelligence, mostly portable or on a commercial basis that is not big efforts to manufacture them in case of order.
4. Of great importance in such conditions is the presence of special means of surveillance, with the possibility of remote installation and receiving a signal, including video of the observed area. This allows the defender to discover the enemy at a great distance, to clearly define the nature of the action and to cause the timely defeat.
When you execute even a part of the described conditions, namely, the availability of capital intelligence, proven tactics reflection of the interaction between the defending units, the application of disguise and stratagem will allow you to defeat two of the three that’s what the gang in order to wean them from capturing towns and to enable the army to destroy them during the offensive.