Regarding the question on the subject of what would happen if Erdogan dare to send troops into Syria, according to rough estimates in the operation, he will be able to use two army corps and the various parts of the gain (it should be understood that part of the army and security forces are now involved in operations against the Kurds ) and from 40 to 60 thousand. man personnel, guns and MLRS 250-300, 700-900 tanks, armored combat vehicles and different. These forces will be enough to create a “security zone” in the areas adjacent to the Turkish border (of course, possible surgery, which involved a much smaller force). In direct contact with the Syrian army Turks can start in the mountains of Latakia, but because of the nature of the theater, then a maximum of Turks will be able to start to squeeze the Syrians from the positions that CAA seized from “green” to ensure control over the border and channels of supply PAS & Co. Some mistakenly think that if Turkey attacks Syria, the first thing it will be to fight against the Russian contingent. This is not true. If such a situation happens, the front in the common areas will keep the first Syrian army. Iran, Russia and Hezballa as before it will indirectly support the direct and indirect methods.
The Syrian army continues to expand the corridor pierced 2 days ago and cut supply rebel groups north of Aleppo. The enemy is not yet able to regroup and take action against the still relatively narrow operational intestine. Of key importance is the superiority of Syrian troops in armored vehicles and systematic air strikes videoconferencing RF, which prevent “green” to regroup and take effective countermeasures.
Regarding the threat of invasion, this can be quite a natural reaction to the destruction of the Turkish strategy related to the indirect action in Syria hands of various groups. Now due to the efforts of Syria, Russia, Iran, and the Kurds, this strategy is bursting at the seams. Since the Turkish levers of influence on the situation are getting smaller due to the rebel defeats, it is natural to activate the theme of military aggression with the aim of “creating security zones.”
It is quite reasonable that in the conditions of increasing military successes, it not make sense for Assad to make the required concessions to the opposition and he instead exhibits the necessary rigidity, the more that the resumption of talks in late February, the card control zones and the front line can be quite different, and thus decomposed at negotiations will be a much more favorable to Assad. It is clear that the success of Assad is related to the high activity of Russian aviation, which helps to breach the fortifications of “green” and “black” and paves the way for the advancing mechanized units SAA. If the opposition had really wanted to negotiations, then they should not have begun them with an ultimatum that was trivially rejected, while on the battlefield it was clearly demonstrated in Syria that currently it is the opposition sponsors should be more interested in the negotiations, as the military situation that is emerging is not in their favor.
The Syrian army, with the support Hezbollah troops completely blocked the militants supply channel extends from Turkey through Azaz and at the same time reset in an enclave, which has long been cut off from the main forces. At the same time it continues to develop successfully attack the Syrian army to the east of Aleppo. The grouping of the Caliphate on the verge of falling into the boiler. Mechanized units of the Syrian army left to get to the highway running through Al-Bab, and then collapse of the Caliphate group supplies to the east of Aleppo.
In general, the current course of events in the war with pro-Western rebels is quite favorable for Assad, who feels much more confident today than it was in the late summer of 2015. Accordingly, it is because of these successes in the negotiations with the opposition may take a tougher stance and try to dictate the terms on which it should be realized post-war settlement. The war in this case is a classic element of the implementation of other means of political goals. The war against the Caliphate is now somewhat in the background, but from it will not exists just at this stage it is important to defeat the pro-Western opposition and to improve the position of Assad in the negotiations, and the Caliphate time will come later, when Russian and American coalition more closely will be engaged in the dismantling of the Caliphate.